Registered to Whom? A Digital Ownership Audit for Firms That Never Checked
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The website loads, the email arrives, and the invoices go out. For most UK firms that is the full extent of the question. Nobody has asked who actually holds the keys to the infrastructure, and in a surprising number of cases the answer is someone who left two years ago.
Digital ownership is the least glamorous form of key-person risk. It does not appear on the balance sheet, it is rarely covered explicitly by insurance, and it tends to surface at the worst possible moment: the morning a renewal fails, or the week an agency goes into liquidation.
The assets nobody lists
A practical inventory usually starts with the domain name and then expands, because the domain is only the first layer. Below it sit nameservers and DNS records. Above it sit the website, the email tenant, the analytics, the marketing tools and the social profiles that carry the firm's public identity.
The full list is longer than most partners expect:
- every domain the firm owns, including defensive and legacy registrations, plus redirects
- DNS records, including mail (MX), SPF, DKIM and DMARC
- hosting and content management system accounts
- the email tenant — Microsoft 365, Google Workspace or otherwise — and its global administrator
- the website's admin accounts and any plug-in or licence subscriptions
- analytics and tag management properties
- social profiles, including the person-level admin of any company page
- the Google Business Profile and any review platforms
- payment gateways, e-signature tools and the client portal
- VoIP and telephony accounts
- the certificate and any domain-verification records
Building the inventory
For each asset, record the purpose, the provider, the account holder by name and email address, the payment method on file, the renewal date, the annual cost, the current administrators, the recovery route if the primary contact is unavailable, and how critical the asset is to client service.
Two columns do most of the work. The first is account holder — "the firm" is not an answer. The second is recovery route: precisely how access would be regained if the named individual were uncontactable.
Testing control rather than access
Most firms have access. Far fewer have control, and the distinction is what matters in a continuity event. Four questions test it:
Can you renew the domain without asking anyone? Check the registrant contact, not just the login. A domain registered in a web designer's name, on the designer's email address, is not the firm's domain — whatever the invoice says.
Can you change the nameservers? That is the test of real DNS control. If only the agency holds the registrar account, the firm has a website, not a domain.
Can you obtain the transfer authorisation? For a .uk domain this means the IPS tag at Nominet; for a .com it means the authorisation code, and remember the sixty-day lock that follows a registrant change.
Can you remove the other administrators? If not, control is shared rather than held.
A public lookup through RDAP or a WHOIS service will show the registrar and, often, the registrant email — the quickest way to discover that a firm's primary domain is registered to a personal Gmail account.
The two-factor and recovery problem
Two-factor authentication is only as strong as the device and number behind it. A firm whose domain registrar relies on the mobile number of a former marketing manager has an authentication control that left with the employee.
Role-based accounts — domains@, web@, it@ — with recovery routed to a monitored inbox and hardware keys held by two named people are a modest improvement that costs almost nothing. Personal credit cards on recurring billing should be replaced with a firm card, because a lapsed payment is an outage.
Remediating without disrupting client service
The common mistake is to attempt everything in one weekend. The safer sequence is deliberate:
- Obtain written acknowledgement from whoever currently holds the account, before anything changes. Most former suppliers and staff will cooperate; the ones who will not are exactly the ones to identify early.
- Export the DNS zone file and take a full backup of the website and mail configuration.
- Move the registrar account first, then set the registrar lock and two-factor authentication, then update registrant and administrative contacts.
- Move hosting and DNS only if required, and change one record at a time.
- Adjust mail records last, with SPF, DKIM and DMARC in place before MX. Never on a Friday, and never the week of a major client deadline.
- Test deliverability, check DMARC reports, and confirm that inbound mail to a sample of real addresses still lands.
The documents to keep
A one-page register, held with the firm's other critical records, containing the inventory, the named owners and the recovery routes. Add the DNS zone file and a note of the registrar and account numbers. It should be readable by someone who has never touched the website, because that is the situation in which it will be used.
Departing people and departing agencies
The audit is only half the exercise. The other half is prevention. An offboarding checklist should require the revocation of tenant-level access, the transfer of profile ownership, the removal of personal payment methods and the handover of authorisation codes. Any engagement letter with a web or marketing agency should state plainly that domains and accounts are registered in the client's name and under the client's control.
Repeat it annually
Digital ownership decays quietly. One annual review, plus a review after any agency change, website rebuild or senior departure, is enough to keep it honest. A calendar reminder sixty days before each renewal costs nothing and prevents the most avoidable outage in the firm.
The test of ownership is simple. If the person who set it up left tomorrow, could the firm still renew it, move it and prove that it did?